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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, economic geography has recovered a relevant role in the world 
of politics. Continous changes in the frontiers of many countries, or the possibility of 
economic integration, are facts that have contributed to this general interest. At the same 
time, a lot of economic research has appeared in the area of regional economics. Brian 
Arthur's (1990a, 1990b) papers on externalities and scale economies have also contributed, 
as discussed by Krugman (1992), to this development. These results can be applied to 
spatial and regional economics. For example, when firms enter a market they do it in 
sequence. Each firm chooses its location on the basis of the number of firms located in 
the area. Therefore, the geographic preferences of the first firms condition the decisions 
of the following firms, and this reflects the importance of historical events. But, when 
several equilibria are possible, history does not necessarily choose the best. So, as Rauch 
(1993) said, any region or country may be condemned to poverty due only to bad luck. 
Nevertheless, a country is not a monolitical organization that works as a whole, but 
rather a structured organization in which cities play a fundamental role. Why are in-
dividuals concentrated in cities? In the last few years, some articles explain this fact 
through formal microecomic models 1. In these papers cities emerge from the interactions 
among individuals. In this essay we present a variation to one of these models following 
Krugman (1993). In Krugman's model, agglomeration emerges from three sources: the 
existence of economies of scale at the firms' level, transportation costs, and the mobility 
of labor. Increasing returns to scale imply that the production of each good will take 
place in a single location. On the other hand, the existence of transportation costs means 
that the best locations for a firm will be those with an easy access to markets. These 
places are those where products are concentrated. But in this model not all factors are 
mobile, farmers are immobile and are the centrifugal force that breaks agglomeration. 
However, farmers do not seem to be the force that is putting a stop to the growth 
of cities. Furthermore, if farmers are playing the role of immobile factors, such as land, 
lSee Fujita (1988), Henderson (1974), and Krugman (1991-1993) among others. 
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it is ad hoc to assume that they produce an agricultural good that is mobile. Since the 
underlying idea is that this mobile agricultural good can make returns to land in region 
1 easily transfereable to region 2, this is not credible. Moreover, the biggest cities have 
problems of city traffic, pollution or high housing prices that make smaller cities more 
attractive places to live in. In this paper we try to explain the formation of metropolitan 
areas, where farmers do not have a big effect, and where congestion costs influence the 
configuration of cities. 
For these reasons our model takes off from Krugman's since it keeps the same cen-
tripetal forces, but it departs from it in the centrifugal forces, which in our model will 
be due to the introduction of congestion costs. In our work, as opposed to Krugman's, 
congestion and transportation parameters are the result of the government optimizing its 
objective function. The role of the government is studied and all the results are charac-
terized analytically. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the assumptions of the 
model and analyze the short and long-run equilibrium, as well as the stability. In section 
3 we discuss the welfare implications derived from investments in transportation and 
congestion infrastructure. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2. The basic model 
2.1. Assumptions of the model 
We assume an economy with a large number of potential goods that appear in the utility 
function in a symmetric way. All consumers have the same CES tastes: 
where the elasticity of substitution between any two goods,a, is greater than 1. 
Individuals may move across J different cities. Let Aj be the share of population in 
city j at any point in time. In this economy there are two types of workers: firm-workers 
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and government-workers, ~j being the number of firm-workers in city j. There is only 
one factor of production: labor. All goods are produced under economies of scale with 
the same tecnology Lij = a + {3xij (a > 0, {3 > 0), where Lij is the number of workers 
needed to produce Xij units of good i in city j. We assume full employment in each city 
at any time, so Ei Lij = Aj. 
In this model we introduce transportation and congestion costs. Following Krugman, 
they take the iceberg form. This means that a fraction of any good produced by a firm 
disappears before this good arrives to the consumer. So, if a unit is shipped from city j to 
city k, the amount that arrives is only e-rDjk-'YkAk, T being the parameter of transportation 
costs, ,k the parameter of congestion relative to city k 2, and Djk the distance between 
cities j and k. We can see that the city size affects the loss due to agglomeration. 
A characteristic of this model is that the parameters of congestion and transport are 
not fixed, but can be modified by changing the number of people that work in this area 
(government-workers). Let Nr and N'"( be the number of people that work to reduce 
the transportation and congestion costs respectively for the whole economy. We assume 
for analytical convenience that there is a proportion of Aj of these workers in every city 
j. The technology for transportation and congestion has the following functional forms 
respectively: 
Obviously, if Nr = 0 then T = a2, and if N'"( = 0 then ,j = al. This means that al and a2 
are the maximum values of congestion and transportation costs respectively. 
Finally, we suppose that individuals move toward locations with higher real wages, 
the law of motion being: % = PAj(Wj -w), p > 0, where Wj is the real wage in city j and 
W = Lj AjWj is the average real wage. 
2We can treat intra-urban congestion in a more explicit way, such as land consumption and/or traffic 
congestion in cities. But, such an extension would not substantially change the main conclusions of this 
paper. Therefore, we take the simplest form of urban congestion. 
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2.2. Short-run equilibrium 
Drawing on Starret's spatial impossibility theorem (Starret (1978)), Fujita (1993) indi-
cates that there are only two kinds of models which can explain the endogenous formation 
of cities: non-price interaction models and non-competitive models. The model discussed 
here, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)-type monopolistic competition, is included in the last group. 
Scale economies (due to the existence of fixed costs) in production imply that every good 
is produced in only one location, so that different cities have different goods. 
To determine the profit-maximizing behavior of firms it is important to stress the fact 
that there are two types of demand: the demand of individuals living in the city where the 
good is produced (domestic demand) and the demand from other cities (export demand). 
It must be remembered that all goods appear in the utility function in a symmetric way, 
so that all goods are consumed. The important point to notice is that both demands 
have the same price elasticity a, so transportation and congestion costs (which make 
consumers in different cities pay different prices for the same good) do not alter the 
strategy of firms. The reason is that, if we suppose that every firm maximizes its profits 
in each market separately, we will have the same result. Therefore this is equivalent to 
maximizing simultaneously in all markets. 
Let us consider a representative firm situated III city j. Its profit function in its 
domestic market is: 
Wj being the wage rate in city j. 
U sing the relation between the demand function of a good and the consumption of 
this good in city j 
D?( .. .) - 'YjAjC!( . ·e'YjAj p' .) - e'YjAjC!(p~. p' .) 3 
I PI)' P-I - e I PI) '-I - I I) , -I 
3 p_ i is the price of all goods except i charged by the corresponding firm, and p' is the price paid by 
the consumer for the unit of a good 
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we obtain the first order condition 
a 
Pij = Wj{3--. 
a-I 
If we repeat the process in another external market k we will obtain the same condition. 
The only interesting fact needed to prove it is that D~(p·· P .) = e"!>'k+rDjkC~(e"!k>'k+rDjkp .. p' .) 
, '3' -, , '3' -, . 
This result is due to specification of the cost and utility functions. 
We have that all prices are the same within a city. 
Since there is monopolistic competition firms enter until profits are zero. All this 
implies that 
(a-l)f d· d' . Xij = Q: -(3- or every goo z an CIty J. 
Since every firm produces the same quantity and has the same technology, the number of 
firms in a city, nj, will be proportional to its population: nj = nAj, n being the number 
of goods in the whole economy. This value can be obtained by dividing the number of 
firm-workers in the economy by the number needed in each firm. 
At this point it is important to stress that in this economy there are other individuals 
that work for the government, reducing the transport and congestion costs, and collecting 
the same wage in every city as firm workers. Its number, Nr + N,,!, is decided by the 
government in a specific way that will be explained later. We assume that in order to 
pay this wage costs the government charges an income tax 7r such that Lj Aj(7rWj) -
Lj Nr\wj + Lj N,,!AjWj. This implies that 7r = Nr + N"(' 
In this section we assume that workers cannot move to other locations and we obtain 
the wage rate for each city. In order to do this we modify the units of goods such that 
Pij = Wj; this means that {3 equals (t1~1) in the cost function. 
Let us suppose that we have a numeraire good at j = 1. Then all prices in this location 
will be 1, and therefore Wl = 1. 
(1) 
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We can prove that 
1 
Wj = [~Yk(e-('D"+"A')Tkr-'l" , 
where }j is the income of city j, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
So, for a given distribution of the population we can calculate the wage rate in each 
city. 4 We only need to introduce the parameters of transportation and congestion cost 
functions (8n 8,,(, at, a2, Nr , and N"() in the preceeding equations. 
2.3. Long-run equilibrium 
We are now interested in knowing what happens in our economy if workers can move 
between cities. The force that may move workers from one place to another is the real 
wage, defined as the ratio between the wage rate and the price index, namely Wj = wjTj- 1 • 
Using the dynamic process described above we know that workers move to cities with real 
wages above the average real wage and that they move away from cities with real wages 
below average. 
VYe define equilibrium as any distribution of the population between different locations 
such that Wj = W for each j such that Aj =f. 0 and Wj ::; W in another case. In this definition 
we are only interested in the movements of workers, not in movements of firms. The reason 
4We are interested in the values of the parameters of congestion and transportation only in the steady 
state 
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is that, in the relevant equilibria, if workers are in equilibrium (do not want to move) then 
no firm can obtain more profits by moving to a different place. 
In what follows we will consider the case of only two cities, the distance between them 
being normalized to 1. 
Because of the symmetry it is verified that ).1 = ).2 = ~ is always equilibrium, inde-
pendently of the values of the parameters. 
Proposition 1. The concentration of city population zs an equilibrium if and only 
if congestion costs are sufficiently low in relation to transportation costs) namely) if and 
only if /1 ::; 27 -~. In other words) concentration emerges as an equilibrium if investment 
in reducing congestion costs is sufficiently high in relation to investment in transportation 
cost) namely) if and only if N-y ~ 6~ In (2~1 ) + t;NT. 
Proof: see the appendix B. 
What we obtain from this proposition is that higher values of al need higher values 
of investments to reduce congestion, N-y, if we want to guarantee that concentration is an 
equilibrium. In other words, congestion cost is the centrifugal force that works against 
it (if NT is fixed, then lower values of N-y make concentration difficult) and on the other 
hand, transportation cost represents the centripetal force that favors agglomeration (if 
N-y is fixed then, lower values of NT make concentration easier). 
We can see that when transportation cost decreases then concentration is more diffi-
cult. This is exactly the opposite to Krugman's result. In Krugman's model concentration 
is more likely when transport costs are low, because in that case firms do not increse their 
benefits by moving closer to the dipersed farmers. But in the context of metropolitan 
areas our result seems more appropiate, since the lower the value of transportation cost 
between the two cities the higher the importance of the congestion costs that a large city 
expenences. 
\Vhat will happen if N-y < 6~ In ( 2~i ) + tN-y, i.e., if concentration is not an equilib-
rium? 
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In this case: 
and this is equivalent to 
Thus, e-"n < e-T , since u > 1. Using this and remembering the expressions for T1 and T2 
we can see that T1 > T2 • So the cost of living is higher in city 1. What about nominal 
(1-0) 
wages? We know that W2 = eT t1' < 1 = W1. 
We have that, in spite of nominal wages always being higher in city 1 (for every N-y), 
the lower cost of living in city 2 makes this latter place more attractive. We can also see 
that if the technology of congestion and transportation costs are equal (8-y = 8T ) we have 
two possibilities: 
• £!.1. > 20"-1 =? In (2~t) > o. 
a2 q  
Therefore, it may be possible to find equilibria such that N-y > Nn and others in which 
N-y < NT • Moreover, if a1 < a2 (i.e. if the maximum congestion cost is lower than 
the maximum transportation cost) so therefore In ( 2~i) < 0, so it is not necessary to 
use more resources in congestion than in transportation to obtain that concentration is 
equilibrium. To see this we only need to prove that function f( u) = 20"q-1 is monotonous 
and limO"--+l f(u) = 1. We know that u> 1, then: 
This is we first commented. 
a1 1 2u - 1 
-< <---
a2 u 
8 
2.4. Stability 
We are now interested in the local stability of equilibria. For this we need to consider the 
law of motion, that in the case of two cities has the following form: 
Taking this into account, an equilibrium will be stable if when Al increases by a negligible 
amount then W2 > WI and when Al falls then W2 < WI' In other words, when d(w~~W2) < O. 
Proposition 2. If concentration is an equilibrium and real wages in both cities are 
different then this equilibrium is stable. 
Proof: 
Assume that Al = 1 is an equilibrium and WI =I W2' This implies that WI > W2, and by 
using the fact that the functions that define wages are continuous, we have that negligible 
changes in Al are followed by negligible changes in wages. Therefore, WI will continue 
being greater than W2, q.e.d. 
The next question is: When is even distribution stable? To ask ourselves that we have 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Al = A2 = ~ is a stable equilibrium if and only if 
where, 
1 1 - 7r 1-0' 11. ) _1_ (-2-) e 2 (1 + eT(I-u )1-0', 
1 - N-y - NT , 
s!!2. aIe- -y 2 , 
T 
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A 
Proof: see the appendix C. 
To study the previous results we will consider specific values for the parameters. All 
graphs are calculated, following Krugman (1992), with an elasticity of substitution be-
tween any two goods of 4. In these first figures al = a2 = 1 and 8"( = 87 = 10. This means 
that if no investment is made then the loss due to transportation cost is 63.21 % and the 
loss due to congestion cost when Al = 1 is 63.21 % and when Al = ~ is 39.35%. So, loss in 
congestion and in transportation are very high. The curves that appear in the following 
graphics represent wage differentials as a function of the population in city 1. 
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From the graphics we can observe that: first, when investment in congestion increases 
(see figure 1) then the curve of wage differential turns counter- clockwise and therefore, it is 
easier for the concentration to be an equilibrium (see proposition 1). This is because when 
investment in concentration increases congestion cost decreases. Second, when investment 
in transportation increases (see figure 2) the curve of wages differential turns clockwise 
and it is therefore more difficult for concentration to be an equilibrium. We can see that 
an even distribution is only stable when N r = 0.3 N y = 0.1. 
We have seen in proposition 3 an analytical condition under which even distribution is 
a stable equilibrium. However, the involved expression is cumbersome. Clearer condition 
can be found in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. By assuming that u 2:: 2.5, a necessary condition to warrant the 
stability of an even distribution is that ~ <~. What implies that 
(u; 1) (1 _ eT(l-a») + (2 + (u - 1h) eT(l-q) + (u -lh - 2 > O. 
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This condition holds if I is high. 
A sufficient condition to guarantee that ~ < ~ is 
(2 + (0- - 1h)eT (1-u) + (0- - 1h - 2 > o. 
This means that I must be high enough and T small enough in order to guarantee this 
inequality. 
Proof: see the appendix D. 
3. Comparison of stable equilibria. The role of the State. 
We have already examined the conditions under which concentration and even distI'i-
bution of the population are stable equilibria, with fixed investment in congestion and 
transportation costs. But different investments involve different costs and therefore differ-
ent welfare levels. In this subsection we will consider the problem of choosing the optimal 
N y , NT that maximizes the surplus of the economy (actually consumer surplus because 
profits are zero). We assume that the government is unable to decide on the amount of 
resources that the economy will employ in this area. Concentration can be a stable equi-
librium under different values of N-y, NT) the state will choose the values that maximize 
the utility of a representative individual (all have the same tastes). Likewise for the case 
of equal distribution. Finally we will compare the best concentration to the best even 
distribution. On the other hand, we will present some results about the importance of the 
moment in which investments on congestion and transportation infrastructure are made. 
Proposition 5. The value of N; that maximizes the utility function of each individual, 
when population is concentrated in one city is zero and the value of N; is also zero if 
u~l 2:: alo-y and is the solution to (1 - N-y)alo-ye- 6-yN-y = U~l in another case. This means 
that if congestion costs are very high (al high) or if technology is efficient (o-y high) then 
N; > o. 
Proof: see the appendix E. 
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Taking into account that g(N-y) = (1 - N-y)a 18-ye-8-yN-y is a decreasing function for 
o ~ N-y < 1 where d~ = -al(8-ye-S-yN-y + (1 - N-y)8~e-S-yN-y) is decreasing in aI, we can 
-y 
see that when the maximum congestion cost al increases, then the optimum value N; 
(the point at which g(N;) = q2~1) is obviously greater (see figure 4). In other words, the 
optimal investment in congestion increases as does the initial congestion, al. 
We are not interested in finding the values of investment that maximize the utility 
function in general, without constraints, but only those values that guarantee that con-
centration is a stable equilibrium. Hence we can reformulate the above proposition to 
consider the optimum values under which concentration is an equilibrium (stability is not 
a problem, see prop.2). 
Proposition 5'. The optimal value of investment in transportation cost, N;', when 
concentration is an equilibrium is always equal to zero. 
11 a < a or a > a and £l. < 217-1 then N*' = N* 1 - 2 1 2 a2 - 17 -y-y 
congestion that guarantees that concentration is a stable 
~ 
N;' = max{N;, 1-y In( 2:~i n· 
a 
Proof: 
is the optimum investment in 
equilibrium. In another case, 
When NT = 0 we know that concentration is an equilibrium if and only if 
1 £l. 
N-y > "8ln( 2:~1 ). 
-y 17 
~ 
If al < a2 or al > a2 and ~ ~ 217;1 then In(.;t) < o. This implies that every NT > 0, in 
a 
particular N;, satisfies the above condition. 
~ 
If al > a2 and £l. > 217-1 then In( 2:~1 ) > O. We know that below N; the utility func-
az 17 --a--
tion increases and above this point it decreases, thus the maximum value that guarantees 
~ 
equilibrium is N;* = max {N;, s~ In( 2:~1 )}, q .e.d. 
a 
Proposition 6. To calculate optimal investment in the case of an even distribution 
we will consider the following cases: 
1. If congestion costs are small and technology zn congestion zs inefficient then the 
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optimal decision policy is not to invest in congestion. Namely, 
ti a 
al...2. :::; -- implies that N:* = O. 4 a -1 1 
2. If technology in transportation is not very high the optimal decision policy is not to 
invest in transportation. In fact, 
3. If technology in transportation is not slightly efficient, congestion costs are high and 
technology in congestion is efficient, then the optimal policy is only to invest in 
congestion. Namely, 
1 
N** = 0 
imply that T 
N;* > o. 
Moreover if N;* is not very high,( a/f(1- N;*) > U~l)' then 
ti-y a. I· h N** 0 
al "'4 > a _ 1 zmp zes t at -y > . 
4- If technology in congestion is not very efficient but technology in transportation is 
efficient, then the optimal decision policy is to only invest in transportation. Namely, 
a ~ <...E-l 4 - u-l 
...E- (1 + e(U-I)a2) < ti a 
u-l T 2 
1 imply that N;* > 0 
N** = O. 
-y 
Moreover if N;* is not very high, ( U~l (1 + ea2 (u-l)) < tiTa2(1 - N;*)), then it is 
verified that, 
5. If technology in transportation and in congestion are both efficient then the best is 
to invest in at least one of the sectors. In other words, 
8.., u 
al ...... >-4 u-l 
...E- (1 + e(U-I)a2) < ti a 
u-l T 2 
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1 imply that N** > 0 T and/or 
N;* > o. 
Proof: see the appendix F. 
Proposition 6'. If there is no transportation cost (a2 = 0), then the optimal invest-
ment obtained in Proposition 5 guarantees that even distribution is an stable equilibrium. 
Proof: 
We can prove that when a2 = 0 even distribution is always a stable equilibrium, inde-
pendently of the values of the other parameters. So, in particular, the optimal investment 
guarantees that even distribution is a stable equilibrium, q.e.d. 
In the following proposition we will compare the two equilibria studied: concentration 
and even distribution. 
Proposition 7. Even distribution is better than concentration if and only if 
1 
207 1 (1 + e(l-u)a2e-6rNr) 07-1 2" 1 -N°' (1 - N;*' - N;*')C7-T (2Q:0") 1-" 6 N-y > (1 - N;') ,,-1 (Q:0")1-"e-a1e -Y, 
Q]e- -Y"7"" 
e 
where N;' is the optimal value that guarantees that concentration is an equilibrium and 
N;*', N;*' are the optimal investments that guarantee the stability of the even distribution. 
Proof: 
It follows from the proofs in propositions 5 and 6, that it is only necessary to compare 
the expressions for Ul and U 1, 
2 
q.e.d. 
Now we will see all these results in three examples, where the value of the parameter 
0" = 4, as in Krugman. 
Example 1. We consider small congestion costs and high transportation costs, namely 
al = 0.25, a2 = 1.5, with different parameters of technology in congestion and transporta-
tion. When 8"( = 8, 8'T = 180 the optimal investments in the case of an even distribution are 
N;* = 0, N;* = 0.025 and in the case of concentration N; = 0.043, N; = O. If we calcu-
late the utility obtained -in both situations (which are stable equilibria) we have that even 
distribution is the best. When 8"( = 8,8'T = 1, optimal investments in the case of an even 
distribution are N;* = 0, N;* = 0, and in the case of concentration N; = 0.043, N; = O. 
If we calculate the utility in both situations we have that concentration is the best. (In 
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this case even distribution is not stable, but this is not a problem because the utility value 
that guarantees stability is always less than the utility value without constraints, and the 
latter is less than the utility value in the case of concentration). We can see that in spite 
of high transportation costs, if technology in transportation is sufficiently efficient then 
society is better off if individuals are located in two cities. 
Example 2. Now we consider high congestion costs and no transportation costs, 
namely al = 1.5 and a2 = O. When technology in congestion is not efficient,8" = 1, the 
optimal investment in congestion is N;* = O. When technology is very efficient, 8" = 100, 
then optimal investment is N;* = 0.065. So we can see that when technology in congestion 
is efficient then the best is to invest in congestion, but when it is slightly efficient then it 
is the best not to. Using Proposition 6 we also know that in both cases even distribution 
is better than concentration. 
Example 3. When we consider high congestion costs and small transportation costs 
(al = 1.5 and a2 = 0.25), technology in congestion is not very efficient and technology in 
transportation is very efficient (8" = 8 and 8r = 100), we have that optimal investments 
in the case of an even distribution are N;* = 0.1548, N;* = 0.01967 and in the case 
of concentration N; = 0.24, N; = O. If we compare the utility values in both cases 
we find that concentration is better. So, in spite of small transportation costs, it is 
possible for people to be better off in the case of concentration rather than in the case of 
even distribution. This is not an intuitive result, but it happens because when the city 
population increases the total amount of resources in congestion invested in this city also 
increases. So, there is a trade-off between congestion and investments. 
In what follows we will show some examples and results about the importance of the 
moment in which investments on congestion and transportation infrastructure are made. 
In the first example we assume that T = 0.26 and a = 4. If we initially consider that 
, = 0.5 and later government carries out an investment on congestion infrastructure in 
such a way that, = 0.35 we will have the next figure. 
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Figure a Congestion infrastructure change 
We can observe that when 'Y = 0.35, 5 equilibria emerge, two of them being unstable 
(the two interior asymmetric 5 equilibria) and the other three stable ( concentration in each 
city and even distribution). Therefore, in the long-run, when congestion costs are 0.35, 
concentration and even distribution emerge as possible stable equilibria. Let us consider 
that population is initially distributed in such a way that ).1 is some value between 0 
and the unstable equilibrium of left side. In this case, if the government change the 
congestion infrastructure and afterwards the economy move to the long-run equilibrium, 
then concentration in city 2 would be the final situation. However, if we change the order 
trought which this process is made, and government invests in the long-run then even 
distribution would be the final equilibrium. 
Different equilibria imply different welfare level. In order to compare these two equi-
libria we can use the following proposition. 
Proposition 8. The utility level of a representative individual in city 1, when all 
of them are concentrated in this city, is higher than the utility level of a representative 
individual of this city, when population is even distributed between the two cities, if and 
5We define asymmetric equilibrium as any equilibrium where the size of the two cities are different. 
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only if 
2 2 
'Y < a _ Iln( 1 + e(l-U))· 
This means that whenever 'Y > (7~11n(2) even distribution is better than concentration, 
indepentently of the values of the transportation parameter. 
Proof: see the appendix G. 
Figure a represents the case in which, at the begining, even distribution is the only 
stable equilibrium and after investments in congestion infrastructure concentration and 
even distribution are simultaneously stable equilibria. Other cases where we can find the 
same differences between the effects of investments in congestion infrastructure are those 
where before and after the investment both equilibria, concentration and even distribution, 
are stable. These two possible situations are depicted in the next figures. 
YI 
Figure Al. Congestion infrastructure change 
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Figure A2. Congestion infrastructure change 
We already know what are the conditions under which concentration and even distri-
bution are stable equilibria (see propositions 1, 2, and 3). Therefore, we have analytically 
distinguished the two cases where investments in congestion infrastructure leads, depend-
ing on the moment of such a congestion improvement, to different long-run equilibria. 
We will now analize the effects of a tranportation investment over the spatial configu-
ration. Let consider the case where, = 0.35 and a = 4. If initially T = 0.6 and after the 
investment is T = 0.26 we have the following graphs. 
0.01\ 0.1 
0.04 0.2 
~ 0.02 
r 
.:. 0 --------------------;;-----_____ <::-__ . __________________ _ 
.. uaO.26 -:: 0.1 r 
.0.2 
.0.3 
~.OK 0'---=':0.1---=0":-.2 --:':0.3:--:0:":-.4 --:':o~:--:o:":-.• ---='0.'=--0:":-.• ---='0.9,,---J, .0'·0'---=':0.1---=07".2 ---:':0.3---:0":-.4 --:':O~:--:O:":-.• ---='0.':--:0:7.'---='0.::-9 ~ 
lambda I lamhdill 
Figure b Transportation infrastructure change 
In these figures we can observe that when T = 0.6 concentration is the only stable 
equilibrium. However, when T = 0.26, even distribution emerges as another stable equi-
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librium in addition to two unstable equilibria. Let us consider that population is initially 
distributed in such a way that Al takes some value between the unstable equilibrium of the 
left and ~. If government carries out the transportation improvement before the economy 
arrives to the long-run, then even distribution will be the final equilibrium. However, 
if the change is made after the economy arrives to the long-run then concentration in 
city 2 will emerge as the final equilibrium. As we pointed out in the case of congestion 
infrastructure, two different final equilibria means two different welfare levels. But there 
is a change with respect that case. When people are agglomerated in one city in the long-
run, an improvement in transportation infrastructure such that the situation is similar to 
the previous figure, implies that this expenditure does not have any effect over the cities 
configuration. Then society would bring in a lost. Therefore, the two final equilibria 
that we must compare in this new situation are the initial long-run equilibrium where all 
people are concentrated in city 2 and the final long-run equilibria where people are evenly 
distributed between the two cities after the investment in transportation. We do this in 
the next proposition. 
Proposition 9. The utility level of an individual in city 1, where all people are 
concentrated, before the improvement in transportation infrastructure, is lower than the 
utility level of an individual of city 1, after the transportation investment, when people are 
evenly distributed, if and only if 
This means that this condition is verified if transportation technology is very efficient, 8T 
very high, and congestion costs are high. 
Proof: 
It follows from the substitution of the appropiate equilibria in the utility expressions 
written in the proof of the previous proposition. q.e.d. 
\Ve are now interested in characterizing similar situations to that of figure b. As we 
said in the congestion case, they are the following. 
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Figure Bl. Transportation infrastructure change 
Figure B2. Transportation infrastructure change 
In order to analytically clasify these cases we only need to apply the mentioned con-
ditions about the stability of concentration and even distribution equilibria. 
Finally, me must emphasize the differences between a transportation and a congestion 
improvement over the pattern configuration. As we saw in proposition 1, a transportation 
improvement means that even distribution is the result that emerges easier. On the other 
hand, a congestion improvement implies more concentration. Propositions 5 to 7 allow 
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us to compare the effects of investments in these infrastructures over the welfare level. 
However, government can be interested in favoring dispersion, for some reason different 
from increasing the utility level of its citizens. Proposition 1 tells us that if this is the 
case the best is to improve the transportation infrastructure instead of the congestion one. 
In other words, if the government wants to make less crowded Madrid, for example, the 
right policy would be to improve transportation between this metropolis and the small 
towns around it: Getafe, Leganes, Alcorcon, ... instead of an improvement in its subway 
or urban buses. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed a model that explains the existence of metropolitan 
areas through the interactions of different agents. Our framework is a monopolistically 
competitive general equilibrium model based on Krugman (1993). We have obtained 
that increasing returns of scale and the existence of transportation costs are factors that 
favor agglomeration and that, on the other hand, congestion costs work against this 
agglomeration. Recalling Krugman's paper we can see that centripetal forces are the 
same, but that centrifugal forces are no longer farmers but congestion costs. We have 
not only studied the case when concentration is an equilibrium in numerical examples, 
but also under what values for parameters of congestion and transportation costs, the 
concentration of population in one city and even distribution between two cities are stable 
equilibria. We have obtained, first, that even distribution is always an equilibrium, but 
it is only stable when congestion costs are high enough. Secondly, concentration is an 
equilibrium if and only if congestion costs are sufficiently low in relation to transportation 
costs, or in other words, if investment in reducing congestion costs is sufficiently high in 
relation to investment in transportation costs. We can observe here another difference 
from Krugman's model because we have obtained that when transportation cost decreases, 
concentration is more difficult, whereas Krugman obtains the reverse. The reason for our 
result (which seems more appropriate in the context of metropolitan areas) is that it 
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is more advantageous not to be concentrated and to suffer small transportation costs 
while consumers import some goods rather than being concentrated and suffering more 
congestion costs. In the case of concentration we have also proved that stability is not 
a problem, in fact, if concentration is an equilibrium, it is stable. Finally, in our model, 
the government can modify the values of several parameters. So, it must decide what 
amount of resources to invest in congestion and transportation to reduce respective costs 
in such a way that society is better off. There are certain aspects that this paper does 
not explain and that would be interesting to answer. One aspect would be to study the 
case of more than two cities. The other would be to know how to change the distribution 
of population between cities from one initial stable equilibrium to another which is better 
when investment in congestion and transportation costs is fixed. 
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Appendix 
A. The wage rate 
We begin by solving the following problem 
max (~~';'r' 
s.t. c~eTDI"+'Y".\" + LP~kC7 = m 
i:;i:l 
where, c7 is the consumption of good i by an individual of city k, good 1 is the numeraire, 
P~k is the c.i.f. price paid by this individual for a unit of good i, and m = (1 - 7r )Wk is the 
income of this individual. 
If we calculate the first conditions we have 
k 
c· , 
This equation can be rewritten as follows 
U sing that et = AkC7 we have 
I ek Pik i 
\Ve define Yk = (l-7r)Akwk as the income in city k. This income is used to pay for goods 
consumed in this city, i.e. Yk = L-i p~ker Using the above expressions and by making 
easy operations we can write 
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Rearranging we have 
(8) 
Let S2k be the expenditure in city k for goods produced in city 2, namely, S2k = n2p~kC~ 
(we are identifying good 2 with any good produced in city 2). 
If we introduce equation (10) into S2k, then we add in k and finally by using that 
Pjk = pjke(rDjk+'YkAk), we have that 
where 
LS2k = .\2 LYk(W2eTD2k+'YkAkTk-l/-0', 
k k 
Ak(l - 7r) for every k 
i k ~n for every k L: Aj 
1 
[~Aj(WjeTV"",,>, )l-U] >-0 
(9) 
On the other hand, expenditures in each city have to equalize its income, which means 
that 
L S2k = W2.\2. 
k 
(10) 
Equalizing expressions (1l)and{12), we have the following equation if and only if .\2 -1= 0: 
1 
W, = [~Yk( e -(TV,,-h'>')T,)U-1] " 
In the case .\2 = 0 we have to calculate the limit of W2 when .\2 -+ o. The continuity 
of functions that defines W2 implies that the above expression is also valid when .\2 = o. 
This proof can be repeated for a generic city j. 
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B. Proof of proposition 1. 
Suppose that the population is concentrated in city 1, so Al = 1. In this case Yi = 1 - 7r, 
12 = 0, '\1 = 1 - 7r, '\2 = O. Substituting this values in Tl and T2 we obtain that 
Introducing these values in W2 we have 
vVe can interpret this wage as the wage that a worker in city 2 would earn if the population 
there was sufficiently small. Therefore we can calculate Wl and W2 
1 T(1-2.,.) 
W2 = (1- 7r)u=T e -"'-. 
Concentration in city 1 is an equilibrium if and only if Wl ~ W2' This is equivalent to 
e-")'1 ~ eTe~2"'). We can rewrite it as /1 ~ 27 - ~, where /1 = ale-O",(N",( and 7 = a2e-OrNr. 
After a few operations we have another equivalent expression 
q.e.d. 
C. Proof of proposition 3. 
In the case of two cities the price index takes the form 
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and the wage in city 2 can be written as 
where Yl = (1 - 11")Al and Y2 = (1 - 11")W2A2. Substituting Yl,Y2,T[-t,and T{-1 into W2, 
we have that 
1 
W2 = [Al(A2W~-U + A1e'T(U-l)f1 + A2W2(A2W~-U + A1e'T(I-U)f1];;. 
U sing that A2 = 1 - AI, we can derive both sides in the previous expression with respect 
to Al 
.!.w1-U [(A2W1 - U + A1e'T(U-l)f1_ 
a 2 2 
Al(A2W~-U + Ale'T(U-l)f2(_w~-U + A2(1- a)W2U~:: + e'T(U-l))_ 
( \ l-u + \ -'T(U-l))-1 + \ dW2 (\ l-u + \ -'T(U-l))-1 W2 A2W2 Al e A2 dAl A2W2 Al e -
A W (A w1- u + A e-'T(U-l))-2(_w1- U + A (1 - a)w-UdW2 + e'T(U-l))] 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 dAl . 
Evaluating in Al = ~ we know that W2 = 1, and so 
Then it follows that 
dW2 (!) [1 _ (a - 1) (1 + e'T(u-l)f2 _ .!.(1 + e-'T(u-l)f1 _ (a - 1) (1 + e-'T(U-l)f2] = 
dAl 2 a a a 
~ [2(1 + e'T(u-l)f1 (1 - (1 + e'T(u-l)f\ -1 + e'T(U-l))) + 
2(1 + e-'T(u-l)f1 (-1 - (1 + e-'T(u-l)f1 ( -1 + e-'T(U-l)))] . 
Finally 
dW2 1 ; [4(1 + e'T(u-l)f2 - 4(1 + e-'T(u-l)f2 e-'T(U-l)] 
dAl ("2) = 1 - U~1 (1 + e'T(u-l)r2 - ;(1 + e-'T(U-l)r1 - U~1 (1 + e-'T(U-l)r2· 
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Now we will calculate the derivative of Tl with respect to Al (for this we need to obtain 
the derivative of ij with respect to A1, i.e. -D'YNyij) that can be expressed as 
T: (~ = :) [_( W2 eT+'Yl,\1 )1-<7 + 
A2(1 - 0') (W2eT+'Yl,\1fU (~~: e T +'Yl,\1 + W2eT+'Yl,\1il(1- 0'YN'YAd) + 
e'\1'YI(1-<7) + A1 e '\1'Yl(1-U)(1- 0')/1(1- o'YN'YAd] . 
The value of this derivative at point Al = ! is 
Rewriting this expression it follows that 
Analogously we can show that the derivative of T2 with respect to Al at point Al = ! is 
A = 
If we evaluate the price index at point Al = ! we have that 
Finally, 
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Evaluating this expression at Al = ! and by rearranging it, it follows that: 
Recalling the definition we will see that an equilibrium is stable if and only if d(w~~W2) < 0, 
q.e.d. 
D. Proof of proposition 4. 
In order to obtain an easier characterization of the system of equations in proposition 
3 we can first analyze the sign of re at t. Vve assume that there is no investments in 
infrastructures, i.e., , and T are fixed. 
We can write 
where 
A 
B 
c = 
2 
(1 + e(U-l))2 
_2e-T (u-l) 
(1 + e-T(U-l))2 
0" - 1 (1) -2 1 ( 1) -1 0" - 1 (1) -2 1 - --(1 + eT U-) _ -(1 + e-T U-) _ --(1 + e-T u- ) . 
0" 0" 0" 
We will begin by analyzing the sign of C. After some easy calculations it is shown that 
40" - 1 + (20" - 1 )eT(u-l) + (20" + 1 )e-T(U-l) + e-2T(u-l) 
C = 2 2 > O. 
0"(1 + e(u-l)) (1 + e-T(u-l)) 
We should now determine the sign of A + B. We can write 
2(1 + e-T(U-l))2 _ 2e-T(u-l)(1 + eT(U-l))2 
A+B<O {::::::? <0 (1 + eT(U-l))2 1 + e-T(u-l)2 
( ) r(a-I) -r(a-I) {::::::? 1 + e-T u-l < e 2 + e 2 • 
This latter inequality holds for every value of the parameters. Hence, we can conclude 
that A + B < O. 
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Thus, we have that 
dW2 
d)..1 < o. 
On the other hand, by doing algebraic operations we have that 
~~: > -1 ~ 40" - 5 + (5 + 20")e-T(U-1) + 5e-2T(u-1) + (20" - 5)eT(u-1) > o. 
We know that this inequality is verified when 0" ;::: 2.5. Hence, in what follows, we may 
assume these values for parameter 0" (which is not a strong constraint). 
We can conclude that, when 0" ;::: 2.5, 
dW2 
-1 < d)..1 < o. 
Condition ~ < 0 at ~ implies that -T1- 1 (~ - ~) < 0 at that point if even 
distribution is to be a stable equilibrium. On the other hand, 
_T-1 ( dT1 _ dT2) 0 dT2 dT1 
1 d)..1 d)..1 < ~ d)..1 < d)..1 . 
It can be shown that 
By taking into account the value of ~ and that eT (1-u) :::; 1 we have that all terms in 
this expression are possitive except -2. As a matter of fact, because of the first term in 
brakets is also possitive, we can conclude that 
(1 ) dT2 dT1 (2 + (0" - 1),) eT -u + (0" - 1), - 2 > 0 ===? d)..1 < d)..1. 
In other words, this is sufficient condition to obtain that ~ < ~. This will be the case 
when congestion costs are high, and tranportation costs are low. 
When 0" ;::: 2.5 we can write 
dT2d)..1 < dT1 ===? (0" - 1) (1 _ eT(1-U)) + (2 + (0" - 1),) e1- u + (0" - 1), - 2 > o. d)..l 2 
This is a necessary condition to warrant the stability of an even distribution. In order to 
obtain this we need that congestion cost are high enough. q.e.d. 
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E. Proof of proposition 5. 
Let us assume that the population is concentrated in city 1, namely Al = 1. Let i be a 
good produced in city 1. Then consumption in city 1 is Cl = et and in city 2 is Cl = O. 
Therefore, the total demand is the demand in city 1, i.e. ete>'l"Yl. As markets clear, 
production equals demand. The amount of good i produced is XiI = cxa since we have 
modified units such that (3 = c"~1 rl. Then cxa = e}e"'l or equivalently e} = cxae-.,.I. 
B ·d h b f d d d· ·t·· .&. >'(I-1r) >'(I-1r) Th eSl es, t e num er 0 goo s pro uce III Cl Y J IS nj = L .. = I u i =) . en 
I) 0'+ --;--0'(1 0'(1 
n = nl + n2 = (1-1r). Finally we can write the utility function of an individual when 
0'(1 
population is located in city 1 as 
If we calculate the partial derivative respect to Nn we have that 
aUl a (1 N N )-L-l( )_1 'V 0 
-- = --- - - u-l cxa l-ue-,1 < 
aN,. a-I 'T .,. • 
This implies that N; = O. Substituting this value into U1 it follows that 
aUl -L-l _1_ [ a 0 N ] 
aN.,. = (I-N.,.)u-l (cxa) l-u e-"'1 -a-l +(I-N.,.)a l 8.,.e--Y -y . 
The sign of this derivative depends on the expression in brackets, because the other term 
is positive for 0 ::; N.,. ::; 1. If we define function gas g(N.,.) = (1 - N.,.) al 8.,. e-o-y N-y , we can 
see that a~-y < 0 for values 0 ~ N.,. ~ 1. Besides, g(O) = aID.,.,and g(l) = O. 
u 
a/(a·1) 
OL---------=-------Ny 
Figure 3. 
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So, if a18-y ::; CT~l then CT~l > g(N-y), for 0 < N-y ::; 1. This implies that ~~~ < 0 (see 
figure 3). Therefore, the maximum value is N; = o. 
Figure 4. 
N 
"( 
then the optimum investment in congestion, N;, is solution of equation (1-N-y)a18-ye-o-yN-y = 
CT~l' because before N; it verifies that g(N-y) > CT~1 and so ~~~ < 0 and after this point 
g(N-y) > CT~I' hence ~~~ > 0 (see figure 4). q.e.d. 
F. Proof of proposition 6. 
Let i be a good produced in city 1. Then consumption in city 1 is Cl = ~cl and in city 2 
is Cl = ~c? As markets clear, production equals demand, so 
where /1 = /2. In the proof of proposition 3 we said that if good z is produced in city 
1 , CT 
2 then 3:- = (~) . Taking into account that in the even distribution c~ = c! and that ~ Pil t 
, 
~ = eT we may write: c~ = c}e-TCT . Using this we have the following 
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Therefore, 
20"0: 
c~ 
t 
If we introduce this consumption in the utility function of a representative individual of 
this economy (by symmetry his location does not matter) we obtain that 
Following the steps for proving proposition 5, and after a few operations, we can rewrite 
this expression as 
e 2 
It can be shown that 
where 
are non-negative values. 
aUt 
\Ve define the following functions that appear in aNr 
_ ~(1 + e-(1-u)a2e-6rNr) 
0"-1 
(1 - N'T - N-y )8'Ta2e-orNr . 
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It is easy to prove that both functions increase in Nn where :S N r :S 1. On the other 
hand 
-f(O) 
g(Nr'O) 
_0'_(1 + e-(1-u)a2) 
0'-1 
(1 - Nr )8ra2. 
Moreover, when N-y is fixed, the maximum value of Nr is 1 - N-y. At this point it is 
verified that 
- f(1 - N-y) 
g(1 - N-y, N-y) 
_0'_(1 + e-(1-u)a2e-CT (1-N..,») > 0 
0'-1 
O. 
We can prove that g and f are both convex functions in Nr • Now we define the following 
aUt 
function that appears in aN.., 
It is easy to prove that this function h decreases in N-y- Now we can study the following 
cases: 
1. If al ~ :S U~l ' then, 
aUl 
and this implies that atl- < o. So, N;* = O. (see figure 5) 
.., 
0/(0·1) f-----------
O·L-------=~~N--Ny 1- t 
Figure 5. 
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2. If the following condition is satisfied 
then 
aUt 
This implies that - f(Nr ) > g(O, N r ) for each N-r. In other words, aNT < O. So, 
N** = 0 
-r 
Nt 
l-Ny 
Figure 6. 
3. If al ~ > u~l and u~l (1 + e(U-l)a2e-6r ) > 8-ra2, then, using step 2, we know that 
N;* = O. On the other hand, 
h(O,O) = al 8"( > -u-impliesthatN;* > O. 
4 u-1 
We can also see that if N-r is not very high (see figure 7) 
8 U h(O, N"() = (1 - N"()ar.2 > --and then N;* > O. 
4 u-1 
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L-----------~~~----Ny 
Figure 7. 
4. Ifal ~ ::; u~l and u~l (1 + e(U-l)a2) < Ora2 then using step 1 we know that N;* = o. 
On the other hand when N-y = 0 we can see that 
This implies that N;* > o. 
L-------------~~---Nt 
o 
Figure 8. 
If N,,/ > 0 but it is not very high then g(N,,/, 0) > 1(0) and in this case we also have 
that N;* > o. 
5. \Ve can prove this result following steps analogous to 3 and 4. 
q.e.d. 
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G. Proof of proposition 8. 
Let us assume that the population is concentrated in city 1, namely Al = 1. Let i be a 
good produced in city 1. Following the steps for proving proposition 5 we can write the 
utility function of an individual when population is located in city 1 as 
Let i be a good produced in city 1 and suppose that population is even distributed 
between the two cities. Then, as we did in proposition 6, we can write that 
e 2 
By comparing the two utilities, U1 and U 1, we have that 
2 
q.e.d. 
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